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INTRODUCTION 
For too long criminologists have either ignored consumerism or misunderstood the role it plays 
in the constitution and reproduction of our current way of life. Few in criminology have 
acknowledged that consumerism is now integral to our global political economy, and even 
fewer have offered critical accounts of the vital functional and ideological roles consumerism 
has played throughout the history of capitalism. There is, of course, a valuable literature that 
covers most aspects of consumerism and consumer culture, but the illuminating concepts and 
analyses associated with this literature have yet to be integrated into our discipline. Here we 
argue that criminologists must now make a concerted attempt to push critical accounts of 
consumerism towards the centre of our discipline.  
 
CONSUMERISM 
For those readers in the liberal democracies of Europe and North America, it should be 
perfectly clear why some sociologists have for decades talked about the rise of ‘consumer 
culture’ and the development of our present ‘consumer society’ (see for example Baudrillard, 
1998; Bauman, 2007; see also Smart, 2010 for an overview). Consumerism is everywhere. It 
permeates the global north, especially in those nations that have fully embraced the principles 
of neoliberalism. It has forced change upon many modern institutions (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, 1995, 2001) and transformed our cultures and our expectations of collective life 
(Baudrillard, 1998; Bauman, 2003, 2007). Perhaps more importantly, consumerism has 
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infiltrated our dreams (Hall et al, 2008). It shapes our desires, our fantasies and our aspirations. 
As it has overpowered all alternative sources of meaning and value, it has furnished us with 
the symbols we use to gauge our own value and social significance (Winlow and Hall, 2006; 
2009). It mediates human relationships and informs the ways we perceive and interact with 
others (Baudrillard, 1998; see also Miles et al., 1998). It orders new hierarchies and new 
mechanisms of exclusion (see, for example, Hayward and Yar, 2006; Miles, 2014), and it 
reproduces and intensifies the competitive individualism that is such a socially disruptive yet 
economically dynamic feature of postmodern liberal societies (Winlow and Hall, 2012; 2013). 
Its symbols of ‘conspicuous consumption’ (Veblen, 2009) are used to display status and foment 
the envy of others (Hall et al, 2008), yet, paradoxically, they can also be used to communicate 
belonging and a desire for integration and acceptance (Winlow and Hall, 2009a; Miles et al., 
1998). Consumerism’s semiotic system is complex and changing. If our discipline is to 
construct new and enlightened models of socially contextualised motivation that are in keeping 
with the times, criminologists must try to understand consumerism’s impact on our individual 
drives, desires and social motivations – why and how we act and interact as social beings. 
 
Understanding the development of contemporary consumerism should encourage us to think 
again about our history and the forces that have transformed our economies, our cultures, and 
our shared social life. We must also understand that these comprehensive changes to everyday 
social experience play a role in the gradual transformation of human subjectivity (Hall, 2012a; 
2012b). This is not simply a matter of identifying the epidemic effects of consumer culture, 
such as mental ill-health, depression and anxiety (Sloan, 1996), and their various knock-on 
effects, which include obesity, body dysmorphia, anorexia, bulimia, self-harm, suicide, and so 
on (ibid; Schrecker and Bambra, 2015). Whilst of course avoiding crude mechanistic 
determinism, we must look beneath these outcomes to the underlying processual context, 
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particularly the dominance of instrumentalism, cynicism and narcissistic competition in our 
cultural lives. We should connect these processes to politics and economics, but we should also 
be brave enough to contemplate the suggestion that, after thirty years of socially destructive 
neoliberalism, a period in which we have been told repeatedly to value individual freedom and 
wealth above all things, our most basic dispositions and orientation to the world have changed 
(Hall, 2012a). To understand the role of consumerism in these changes we need to return to a 
critique of ideology. It is simply inadequate to keep repeating interpretivism’s domain 
assumption – born in the past to attack crude positivist causality – which tells us that we 
interpret and negotiate meaning before we settle on various interpretations and act in the world. 
Consumer culture is constantly active in those complex webs of meaning and interpretation 
and the broader macro-processes of mass mediation – infiltrating, persuading, humiliating, 
affirming, eroding, reconstructing. We need to rethink consumerism from a criminological 
perspective, identify precisely its relationship to politics, economics, society and culture, and 
locate it firmly in a conjuncture in which the certainties of modernity are rapidly receding into 
the past. One vital aspect of this rethinking involves identifying and discarding obsolete ideas 
and theoretical frameworks from criminology’s past (see Hall and Winlow, 2015) which clutter 
the field and prevent inquisitive researchers from coming to terms with the reality of 
contemporary consumerism.  
 
Our starting point, however, should be to recognise that the democratisation of conspicuous 
consumption in the west has played a dynamic role in the reproduction of the capitalist system, 
with all of its stark inequalities and injustices (Hall et al, 2008). Consumerism feeds on such 
inequalities as it offers what now seems like the sole potential means of compensation and 
escape. However, the escape it offers is a centripetal escape inwards that keeps us invested in 
neoliberalism’s political and economic project (ibid.). It encourages us to forget what we have 
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lost and imagine instead a ceaseless procession of technological innovation and novel 
indulgences that will lead us into a bright future, improve our lives and deliver to us enduring 
happiness. But, as it places individuals in competition with one another for symbols of social 
status, consumerism has eroded modern forms of civil society (see Baudrillard, 2007; Stiegler, 
2009), and it has played a significant role in the dissipation of modernity’s collectivist and 
universalist political projects (Badiou, 2007). As the future looks bright up above, it also looks 
more unstable and fragile down below.  
 
Consumerism and desire 
The pleasures of active consumerism are not all that they seem. As some scholars have noted 
(see, for example, Bauman, 2007), the pleasures of consumerism tend to be quite fleeting. 
Consumerism is not simply about now and then buying a few material goods that we want but 
do not need. It also involves the ritualised act of discarding consumer items that have lost their 
allure, only to begin the process all over again as new products come on to the market (see 
Appadurai, 2011). Consumerism holds out the prospect of satisfaction through ownership, but, 
quickly, we find ourselves assailed by new desires. New trinkets are placed before us, and the 
‘social’ dialogue that accompanies them inspires us to return yet again to the market in the 
hope that these trinkets will assuage the anxieties that gnaw away at us from within. But 
somehow consumerism never quite manages to deliver. Dissatisfaction becomes permanent 
and active.  
 
As Baudrillard (1998) notes, consumerism encourages us to believe that we are affluent, 
content and happy despite there being no rational foundation for such a belief. In fact, as we in 
the west move further and further away from the old world of industrial modernity – with its 
restrictive institutions and its powerful collective systems of belief – contentment and 
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happiness appear to be diminishing. The liberalisation of our culture and economy has not 
produced new freedoms, and it has certainly not created a new world of contentment. Anxiety 
and insecurity abound, and these negative emotions are not restricted to the poor. They exist 
throughout the social structure (James, 2010).  
 
Rarely these days do we reach a point at which we move away from the consumer sphere in 
the belief that it has lost its appeal and no longer has anything to offer us. The market’s 
ideological support systems serve its fundamental growth-fetish by working tirelessly to 
incorporate older populations into the sphere of consumerism (Barber, 2007), just as they do 
with younger populations (Postman, 1996; see also Hayward, 2012; Smith, 2013). We now 
learn to consume at a very young age. We are bombarded with advertising messages and 
quickly become attuned to the power of brands, at home, in the street and even in institutions 
of early education (Beder, 2009). Advertisers now target children (Bakan, 2005; Barber, 2007) 
with incisive marketing campaigns that encourage anxiety and symbolic competition as a form 
of surrogate socialisation (see Hall et al., 2008). Consumerism does not relinquish its grip when 
the individual reaches retirement age. Everyone must consume, and everything that can be 
commodified – including health, education and all other needs once ministered in the public 
realm – must be commodified. All that is holy must continue to be profaned, even when it 
becomes difficult to remember what might have been holy in the first place. 
 
Consumption is not simply the epiphenomenon of production. Consumer desires demand 
advancements in production, which in turn convince us that increased consumption is possible, 
justifying and unleashing further desires. If we were ever to reach a point at which we were no 
longer desirous of consumerism’s products and services, capitalism would plunge into crisis. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, George Bush Jr. encouraged Americans to go shopping in order 
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to get the economy moving again. ‘Head down to Disneyworld in Florida’, he said, bequeathing 
us one of his trademark quirky metaphors. Consume and enjoy your freedoms, he affirmed, 
and in so doing display to our cultural and geopolitical enemies our deep commitment to the 
American way of life. Americans didn’t get where they are today by not consuming. As 
consumerism is ideologically and practically normalised in such no-nonsense terms each 
individual is encouraged to understand herself in relation to its variegated sign-value system. 
As markets approach their limits they must be rejuvenated. New products need to be identified, 
and old products need to be recycled so that they can be resold to younger buyers who have yet 
to encounter their symbolic value. Capitalism is a self-revolutionising economic system. It 
changes only so that it may continue.  
 
However, advanced knowledge of capitalism’s systemic logic, no matter how detailed and 
sophisticated, does not tell us why consumers continue to consume beyond need. How is 
consumer desire constituted? This is the point where the damage caused by the relative 
marginalisation of psychoanalysis across the social sciences in favour of less sophisticated 
frameworks such as symbolic interactionism and post-structuralism – which celebrate 
autonomous resilience, creativity and resistance even when they are in their historically most 
beleaguered and parlous condition – comes into stark relief. Lacanian psychoanalysts have long 
known that desire signifies a lack (Lacan, 2007), an absence, and as such is contingent, fragile 
and ephemeral. As soon as we take ownership of the longed-for thing we are destined to lose 
our desire for it. Desire, therefore, is dependent upon the absence of the desired object. 
Consumer markets are reliant upon this basic principle. Taking ownership of a car, a house or 
a gadget we have longed for does not satisfy us, because desire is immediately reconstituted. 
We immediately begin to focus on another thing, or another experience, and desire begins 
again. Satisfaction, properly understood, threatens consumerism.  
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Furthermore, our desires are never fully our own. It is wrong to assume that they are simply a 
product of our imagination. Our desires are socially mediated. We desire what the other desires. 
Would we desire a Chanel handbag if others do not? Would we desire such an item in the 
absence of marketing campaigns, media coverage and the general cultural acceptance of 
branded ‘style’? The advertising industry’s general understanding of these processes has 
enabled it to reformulate desire and thus expand consumer markets in increasingly 
sophisticated ways by identifying, creating or exacerbating social anxieties, and stimulating the 
deep sense of lack that lies at the core of the human subject (Hall et al., 2008). Even today’s 
social movements, conceptually provisioned by social science’s conservative and liberal 
theoretical frameworks, promote themselves by feeding on the desire for what the neoliberal 
market has made absent – community, authority, security, autonomy, politics, resistance, and 
so on. Once we have been made anxious about our social standing by having doubts cast on 
our imagined personal attributes it becomes that much easier to sell us a commodity that 
promises to mollify our anxieties and boost our esteem. 
 
The process of stimulation and mollification, unlike its effect on the individual psycho-
emotional constitution and social environment, is quite pragmatic and banal. Any material item 
made available for sale is accompanied to market by a range of symbolic lures. Increasingly, it 
is this symbolism that provokes desire and encourages the consumer to part with his money. 
As we hinted earlier, we should not make the mistake of assuming that consumerism and 
consumption are the same thing. Consumption, when it occurs within reasonable limits, is of 
course a basic need. Consumerism is quite different. Consumerism exceeds the functional 
materiality of the object. For example, it seems that many of us in the affluent west no longer 
simply buy a coat in order to keep warm during winter. There are other considerations. We 
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choose a coat from a store that, in all likelihood, contains a great many coats. Our choice may 
be influenced by what appear as practical matters. We may go for the cheapest coat, or a coat 
that has been significantly reduced in price. We may also choose a coat because of its designer 
label, or we may simply like the style of the coat we have chosen above those others on offer. 
We may choose a coat because it is similar to coats worn by friends. We may disregard a coat 
for that very same reason. We may buy the coat because we have seen a celebrity wear a similar 
coat, or because that style of the coat is, at present, considered fashionable. None of these 
matters are clear cut. However, to imagine that we each possess a specific sense of taste entirely 
of our own creation is to accept uncritically the doctrine of the fully autonomous sovereign 
individual.  
 
Consumerism, as Baudrillard (1998; see also Stiegler, 2009) noted, has replaced traditional 
systems of individuation to become a mode of rootless, free-floating competitive 
differentiation. Its purpose is not the satisfaction of needs or desires. In a western culture 
dominated by advertising, we are compelled to discard collective identities and pursue 
individuality, but all we have to construct a sense of uniqueness are the symbols presented to 
us by consumerism’s panoramic sign-value system. Our ‘individuality’ is always anxious, 
incomplete, and, ultimately, a myth that reflects of our growing distance from reality and our 
complete submersion in a commodified hyper-reality that has displaced all collective forms 
and mutual interests. We have stepped outside of history. Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) were 
similarly unimpressed by the promises of consumer individualism. Like Baudrillard, they 
presented such individualism as a functional myth, constructed and constantly reaffirmed by 
various facets of late capitalism’s ideological machine. For them, the pursuit of individuality 
led only to an unfulfilling pseudo-individuality that rested upon the disavowal of the uniformity 
that structured consumer practice. The diner can choose from the menu, but our choice is 
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limited to the options placed before us. Choice, where it existed at all, was restricted, and 
subject to highly advanced processes of manipulation (Ewen, 1998). We should not 
underestimate the skill and incisiveness of the advertising industry or its ability to create within 
us a desire for consumerism’s objects (Lears, 1995; Ewen, 2001), and we should not simply 
ignore consumerism’s social dimension, and the various pressures imposed upon us to 
emotionally attach ourselves to consumerism’s object-symbols.  
 
The way we are constantly persuaded to buy and display object-symbols is complex and 
paradoxical. Contradictory pressure is exerted simultaneously on all of us to both fit in with 
social groups and set ourselves apart from them (Miles et al, 1998; Winlow and Hall, 2009a), 
which energises a dynamic matrix fuelled by the constant adoption and dismissal of identities. 
It is comforting to imagine ourselves as autonomous, discerning consumers able to see the 
dominant ideology for what it is, and position ourselves in opposition to it. However, as we 
dress to reflect our unique choice of style, we also hope to triumph over others carrying out the 
same task. As we donate our energy and our money to consumer capitalism we simultaneously 
and constantly disrupt the social collective in favour of an unstable milieu of competitive 
individualism.  
 
Of course, in most cases we buy our clothes from global corporations that have branches 
throughout the world. Quite often, these stores stock almost exactly the same items. We shop 
in Gap, Primark or Top Shop stores that are replicated across the country and other parts of the 
world, yet we still manage to retain the conceit that we are creative consumers shopping in 
ways that reflect our unique tastes. The conceit of the sovereign individual blinds us to the 
homogeneity beneath the surface of consumer culture, and draws our attention away from the 
process of capital accumulation with its myriad social, environmental and geopolitical 
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problems. However, if we redirect our attention away from this spectacular procession of 
object-symbols and towards our experience of culture, we can begin to glimpse the underlying 
structures and processes in which our tastes are formed. 
 
Consume now! 
How can we contextualise consumerism’s cultural triumph in both popular and intellectual life? 
Our narrative must begin in post-war Europe. The eventual cessation of hostilities after six long 
years of war produced across much of the continent a common desire to avoid further social 
and political upheaval. The establishment of social democratic governance across much of 
Europe fomented a sense of hope among the working class that the obscene hierarchies of the 
pre-war period were gone for good (Hennessy, 2007; Judt, 2010). The Keynesian economic 
model was adopted by politicians in France, West Germany, Britain, Scandinavia and the 
Benelux countries. Sizable welfare states were constructed, and most mainstream politicians 
were committed to the principle of full employment (Judt, 2010). The capitalist class largely 
accepted the new state of affairs. Full employment, rising wages and comprehensive welfare 
systems ensured a degree of political and social stability, which counteracted the threat of leftist 
militancy and rebellion. Capitalism paid a significant price to ensure its survival (see Minsky, 
2008). Taxes on wealth and income rose, and returns on investments fell.  
 
In time, productivity began to rise, which prompted labour unions to become more strident in 
their demands. The lifestyles of the working class improved significantly. Most working-class 
families were not rich by any stretch of the imagination, but, in comparison to the realities of 
life for working-class families before the war, their lot had improved. The British working class 
had overcome many of the huge material pressures and insecurities they had faced from the 
beginning of the capitalist project. Education and healthcare were now free at the point of 
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provision. Work was, for the most part, quite plentiful, and wage levels ensured that, once 
immediate costs had been met, a little disposable income remained that could be used for leisure 
pursuits and creature comforts (see Hennessey, 2007; Judt, 2010). This is not the ‘origin’ of 
consumerism, but it is the era in which consumerism permeated western societies to become a 
mass phenomenon. 
 
The growth of consumer culture during the post-war period is indicative of a number of 
fundamental changes in political economy, but before we address these changes we must first 
of all explain in a little more detail the importance of capitalism’s growth fetish. Capital is not 
simply money. It is money in search of investment. Capital must remain in constant motion, 
moving from investment to investment, securing profit and growing as it does so. If capital 
stands still or withdraws from the fray, it returns to its initial form and becomes once again 
mere money, and in most cases mere money tends to depreciate in value. Without profit-
seeking investment the entire capitalist system is threatened. Capitalists must believe that 
investment in pursuit of profit is a risk worth taking. Without this investment factories lie still 
and financial markets crash.  
 
During the relatively golden years of post-war social democracy, capitalists tended to accept a 
lower rate of return on their investments than they do today. Now the expectations of capitalist 
investors have grown. In a globalising economy the nation-state’s ability to mediate the 
relationship between labour and capital has been diminished, and capital has, to all intents and 
purposes, withdrawn from the negotiating table. These days capitalists, unbound from their 
nation states of origin, are unwilling to accept reduced profits in return for social and political 
order and neoliberal states have neither the desire nor the ability to impose their will on highly 
mobile capital. 
12 
 
 
However, in countries such as Britain during the post-war years there existed a political 
consensus that capital must be controlled and used to benefit the population. Capitalism’s 
innate drive to secure maximum profit was attenuated by the politics of opposition and a robust 
state willing to intervene in the economy to maintain demand and truncate excessive inequality. 
Living standards for many improved significantly, inequality decreased, crime declined to 
record lows, and new markets keen to take advantage of the surplus income of the masses began 
to develop. The first wave of the consumer boom promised to make the lives of consumers 
easier. Washing machines, vacuum cleaners and gas cookers sold well. They possessed an 
obvious use-value. Consumers bought these items because they possessed an appealing and 
demonstrable function. Washing machines, and later spin dryers, made the task of dealing with 
the family’s laundry that much easier. Vacuum cleaners were remarkably easy to use and a 
huge advance upon what had gone before. The initial love affair was with technology. 
 
As markets grew rapidly early forms of consumer competition began to establish themselves 
in popular culture – in neighbourhoods and in family and friendship networks. Consumer 
market sectors relying exclusively on technological innovation quickly reach a saturation point. 
In time, everyone open to the idea of buying a vacuum cleaner already had one. At that point a 
change occurs in the mode of innovation. Technological innovation can no longer be relied 
upon as a constant, so each manufacturer then turns to the advertising industry in the hope of 
encouraging customers to choose their products over others. However, when a market such as 
this is quite advanced, manufacturers are forced to fight for business among a diminishing pool 
of potential customers. In a saturated market demanding more reliability and durability 
manufacturers can no longer wait to sell to those seeking to replace defective products. At this 
point the market must convince those who already own vacuum cleaners to decide that the 
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vacuum cleaner they own is no longer good enough. Either its technology is outdated, and 
better machines are now available, or the symbolic value of the machine has depreciated, to the 
extent that one must purchase again to regain or improve one’s social status in relation to others. 
By utilising sign-value and elevating its significance in the minds of consumers, the market 
was able to overcome the limitations of materiality. In time, the actual function of an electric 
kettle became, for many consumers, less important in purchasing decisions that the sign-value 
attached to the kettle itself. Even relatively uninteresting household items are signified and 
become part of the constellation of consumer culture. Consumerism is not just about 
fashionable markets in clothes and music; it infiltrates every aspect of common culture. 
 
The gradual diminishment of use-value and the massive growth in the importance of sign-value 
enabled the market to keep expanding. Baudrillard (1998) was particularly taken with the 
unending stream of gadgets that began to flood the market from the sixties onwards. His 
analysis occasionally overshot the runway – for instance, two-speed windscreen wipers are 
actually useful in variable weather conditions – but his general point that many products were 
bought primarily to titillate and distract hit the mark. The consumer became increasingly 
convinced that he had left behind the discomforts of reality to occupy a sphere of affluence, 
happiness and perpetual novelty. To the consumer, the commodification and increasingly 
formulaic character of cultural artefacts and the concomitant loss of cultural autonomy and 
authenticity (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997), a process that continues today, became relatively 
less important than the entry into a realm of material comfort and imaginary social status. 
 
This new Imaginary provoked cultural change in working-class communities (Hoggart, 1969). 
Many working-class lives were now liberated from the back-breaking toil and perennial 
economic insecurity that had beset previous generations. Working hours fell and incomes rose. 
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Working conditions improved. Leisure time expanded, as did the range of commercialised 
cultural activities available for workers and their families. Amidst this cultural sea-change of 
displacement and renewal consumer items became progressively more important in processes 
of identity-building. Consumerism’s symbolism worked its way into what had hitherto been 
organic aspects of culture – family, class, community, nation, religion. Slowly, the importance 
of these signs grew and more traditional aspects of common culture receded into history.  
 
But how has consumerism achieved this position of cultural dominance during a neoliberal 
period in which livelihoods have become more precarious and the incomes of most of the 
population have either remained static or fallen? It is embedded within our cultures so 
completely that we often fail to notice its influence. Of course its means of dissemination are 
now technologically advanced and its seductive techniques have been developed to a fine art. 
Western nations are flooded with cheap goods manufactured abroad. But this does not obviate 
the basic financial fact that, strictly speaking, the majority of individuals still cannot afford the 
goods that would temporarily assuage their symbolically charged desires. So how have these 
individuals managed to maintain their commitment to consumerism?  
 
The answer is quite straightforward. Debt. A vast ocean of debt, renamed ‘credit’ to avoid the 
traditional shameful connotations. Psychologically, the embrace of debt has been justified by 
a reworking of the Super-Ego. Whereas the traditional Super-Ego’s harsh judgements made us 
feel guilty for desiring too much, the new ‘Super-Ego injunction to enjoy’ (Zizek, 2009) makes 
us feel guilty if we miss a single opportunity to indulge ourselves. “Reward yourself” it says, 
“you’ve earned it”. In this encouraging cultural climate consumer and household debts have 
grown enormously during the neoliberal epoch even as incomes have fallen in real terms, and 
as job insecurity has established itself as a norm throughout the post-industrial west (Horsley, 
15 
 
2015). As wages stagnated while productivity and profits continued to grow, a huge amount of 
capital was generated, which must find profitable investment opportunities. Rather than paying 
western workers more, capital has paid them less, invested in manufacturing centres abroad 
where profits were even higher and compelled these workers to take on debts and pay interest 
in order to sustain the illusion that they have a recognised place in mainstream society. In basic 
financial terms, capital has claimed larger profits by suppressing wages. It has then loaned the 
surplus capital back to workers as money so they can continue to purchase the consumer items 
that are judged to be of such crucial cultural importance (see Wolff, 2013). Thus a new 
investment mechanism has been created, yet another source of huge profits that accrue from 
developing markets in consumer debt (Horsley, 2015). These debts can be packaged, insured 
and traded in derivatives markets, creating yet another source of profits. In the neoliberal era 
the entirety of the global economy is structured in relation to debt.  
 
We are now encouraged to take on debts while young. Then we must spend much of our lives 
attempting to pay them off. We are encouraged to look forward to an old age free from debt, 
which distracts us from a reality in which a growing proportion of the western population 
structure their existence in relation to their debt obligations. Consumer debt, it seems, plays a 
significant role in subjugating and depoliticising western populations, and encouraging them 
to abandon all hope of systemic change (Lazzarato, 2015). Debt – especially mortgage debt – 
bonds us to the current economic system and ensures that we submit to the established means 
of servicing debt. We work to pay down our debt, and we increasingly see the removal of 
consumer debt as a significant life goal (ibid). We often spend our lives in jobs we hate in order 
to pay back what we owe (Horsley, 2015). We are encouraged to buy now, on credit, and then 
spend years paying back this money. For many, the psychological burden of debt is enormous: 
as the allure of luxury consumption quickly fades, only the debt remains.  
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However, this descent into the vortex of consumer debt could not have occurred without 
underlying changes in political economy. In the 1970s Britain’s industrial economy ran into 
trouble. The reasons for this are complex, but we should note in particular the growth of global 
competition, the rise in oil prices and the insistent demands of organised labour for better wages 
and conditions. Capital had, since the close of the war in 1945, accepted a lower rate of return 
on investments. They had traded off higher profits for the relative social stability provided by 
the post-war social democratic consensus. However, as profits fell further during the 1970s 
while labour unions remained belligerent and taxes remained high, capital rebelled against the 
established consensus and agitated for new economic freedoms. These gradual, behind-the-
scenes changes resulted in the transformation of the Conservative party and the rise of Margaret 
Thatcher, a singularly divisive figure willing to take on the hard work of forging a new politics 
based upon entrepreneurialism, competition and individual reward (see Sandbrook, 2013; 
Bloom, 2015). She actively sought to break the power of the unions (Milne, 2014), and in this 
task she achieved a staggering degree of success. She began to deconstruct the protective 
barriers that restricted profitability. She embraced the rhetoric of the free market, and allowed 
cheap foreign products to flood into Britain. Almost immediately, Britain’s industrial economy 
was thrown into crisis. Unemployment rose to historic heights (Milne, 2014). Thatcher did little 
to protect Britain’s industrial base because, to her, mass unemployment, poverty and social 
distress were ‘a price worth paying’ in order to liberate capital from the shackles placed upon 
it by the social democratic state (see Vinen, 2010). In order to boost economic growth and 
shrink the size of the British state she privatised many of the country’s most prized assets and 
looked to the city of London to boost the countries flagging Gross Domestic Product. 
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Her politics were revolutionary in many respects. Many believed her tenure in office would be 
an aberration, and that the post-war consensus would reassert itself upon her departure. Instead, 
she established a new consensus that encouraged all the politicians that followed her to commit 
to tax cuts and market liberalisation as a means of generating growth. Britain was abruptly 
thrown into a post-industrial economy dominated by an expansive and diverse service sector. 
Blair attempted to compete for hi-tech manufacturing jobs, but by this time the British economy 
was at a marked disadvantage in comparison to countries such Germany and Japan, whose 
manufacturing infrastructure had been refurbished and modernised by US investment after the 
war. However, a liberated financial sector busied itself creating new investment opportunities 
for a global capital, and a downgraded and highly unstable service sector mopped up the rest. 
Britain had moved from being a producer nation, defined by its entrenched class system and 
its extractive and manufacturing industries, to a consumer nation, defined by rising inequality, 
reduced welfare provision and precarious labour markets (Winlow and Hall, 2006). The new 
jobs produced by the service sector were no compensation for the loss of stable and reasonably 
well paid industrial jobs. Britain had gone from being the ‘workshop of the world’ (Samuel, 
1977) to an insubstantial retail park, a journey from the corporeal reality of manufacturing to 
the theme-park hyper-reality of consumerism (see Winlow and Hall, 2013).  
 
Neoliberalism worked up an unstoppable head of steam. The 1990s are often represented as 
the decade in which neoliberalism solidified its reputation for growth and prosperity, but the 
economic reality of those times is more complicated (Stiglitz, 2004). It is true that the city of 
London boomed during those years, but the industrial economy in Britain withered still further. 
Inequality continued to rise and labour markets became yet more unstable. The growth of the 
city and the increased profitability of the financial sector encouraged the new investment class 
to become more confident and assertive in its representations to government. The rest of the 
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country was, apparently, being pulled along on their coattails, an encumbrance creating too 
much drag on the sleek new machine. This new elite pushed for reductions in regulation and 
tax breaks, and, because the financial sector was vital to the national economy, the politicians 
of the main political parties were receptive. Politics, by this stage, had lost much of its 
traditional substance. The key characteristics of neoliberal ideology, economics and 
governance were accepted as a fait accompli (see Winlow and Hall, 2013).  
 
The industrial nations of the old world were, with only one or two exceptions, now consumer 
nations that imported goods from the developing world. The developing world was developing 
rapidly because it was producing most of the basic volume goods for western markets. The 
United States of America underwent similar changes to Britain. At the end of the war it was by 
far the world’s most productive nation. Such economic strength allowed it to offer the old-
world European nations loans to rebuild after the war. This was not an act of largesse. It was 
clear that the United States would benefit economically as Europe redeveloped. Of course, as 
the USA was the global industrial superpower, a significant amount of the money advanced to 
the European states would flow back to the USA as these nations and their corporate sectors 
purchased American goods and services. The factories of the USA would be kept busy as 
European economies improved and as demand increased. However, as the century progressed 
the USA stepped down from its role as an industrial superpower. Deindustrialisation during the 
1980s and 1990s was as disruptive there as it was in Britain, if not more so (see Currie, 2008). 
Although the economy retained proportionately more manufacturing than the UK, key 
American politicians had no desire for the USA to compete head-on with a new generation of 
productive economies. Instead they transformed the country’s economy into a gigantic 
financial vacuum cleaner for global investment capital.  
 
19 
 
Germany and Japan remained hugely productive economies, and, as time passed, they were 
joined by China, India and one or two others. The economies of these countries produced 
significant surpluses. China, for example, tends to produce the consumer items that Americans 
buy, but it must reinvest its surplus in ways that sustain its markets – to enable those who buy 
its products to continue to buy its products. So, to generalise, China reinvests its surplus in 
western consumer economies. This inward investment, circulated through the credit system, 
supplies the west’s army of consumers with the money they need to keep buying products 
manufactured in China and the other industrialising, surplus-generating nations. Money from 
the globe’s key surplus economies flows into Wall Street to the tune of around $5 billion per 
day (Varoufakis, 2011), and, generally speaking, this money tends to flow back to these surplus 
economies as Americans purchase their products.  
 
We now live in an era of low interest rates (Picketty, 2014). Western governments must keep 
interest rates low in order to lubricate consumer markets. The availability of cheap debt has 
played a crucial role in the development of the neoliberal project. As we have already noted, 
wages stagnated as profits rose. However, the availability of cheap debt to chase cheap 
consumer goods created a perception of incremental progress that curtailed any suggestion of 
renewed political militancy. Cheap debt enabled workers to continue with consumer lifestyles 
even though their incomes had not improved a great deal. In Britain and the United States the 
growth of home ownership bound the individual to the neoliberal economic project in a way 
that merely renting a home does not. It militates against political radicalism, and it tends to 
create the impression that one’s lot in life is improving. Such an iconic asset as a house 
occasions us to imagine that we are richer than we are while the low-interest mortgage fades 
unnoticed into the background. 
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CRIMINOLOGY AND CONSUMERISM 
Misunderstanding and misrepresenting consumerism 
Consumerism, we should note, is now so ubiquitous that it can often escape the attention of 
critical social analysts. In criminology, many of those who have addressed consumerism do so 
only in the most basic way. For example, some criminologists have used the term 
‘consumerism’ to communicate only the basic need for goods (see Newburn et al, 2015). Some 
who place themselves on the criminological left have mistaken theoretical critiques of 
consumerism for some sort of condescension felt towards those who consume (see Cooper, 
2012). Others approach it uncritically as the great gift capitalism has bestowed upon its 
populations (see Matthews, 2014), or even identify it as the new wellspring of political 
resistance (Hall, 1981). These positions overlook the key issues at stake and systematically 
ignore consumerism’s most troubling characteristics.  
 
While the material and environmental aspects of consumer culture should be of great interest 
to criminologists, especially those involved in the rapidly developing sphere of green 
criminology, deeper psychosocial accounts of consumer culture require analyses of ideology 
and symbolism (Baudrillard, 1998; Frank, 1998; Hall et al., 2008). However, for over four 
decades many on the political left in Britain have embraced consumerism and focused on its 
supposedly liberating qualities. Many leftist social scientists (see, for example, Featherstone, 
1995; Hall and Jefferson, 2006) have argued that consumerism equips us with a new range of 
signifiers that allow individuals to transcend an inherently repressive social order that sought 
to control the population and reproduce its diverse historical injustices. Consumer culture, they 
argued, allows the individual to take a far more active and creative role in the construction of 
self-identity. For these critics, the old order was breaking apart. The rebellious young consumer 
could no longer be pinned down by the traditional mechanisms of control and repression. The 
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consumer choices of these young people reflected their desire to break free from convention 
and forge a new path of their own creation. Above all, consumerism appeared to facilitate a 
‘rebellion into style’, to bring choice and stylistic diversity to a dour and rather homogenous 
post-war cultural vista. It allowed younger generations to separate themselves from the 
restrictions of the parent culture and identify their own sources of value, which tended to be 
connected to fashion, music and other aspects of popular culture (see Hebdige, 1979; Hall and 
Jefferson, 2006). Consumer symbols could be reworked into new meanings on which forms of 
subcultural togetherness could be founded. Thus cultural in-groups could use consumerism and 
their own unique sense of style to set themselves apart as ‘new communities’, and to reaffirm 
their separateness by constructing their own norms and values, which were believed by some 
to resist modernity’s expansive ‘social control apparatus’ (Cohen, 1979: 340).  
 
Consumerism and the ‘cultural turn’ in Criminology 
Of course, the intellectuals who constructed these perspectives were perfectly aware that 
consumer products were intimately connected to processes of capital accumulation, and that 
corporately manufactured goods carried with them a range of signifiers constructed in relation 
to profit maximisation. They were also cognisant of the fact that these signifiers bonded the 
individual to the reproduction of capitalism. However, these new leftists were convinced that 
all the while the consumer symbols that represented capital accumulation and systemic 
reproduction were being reworked and subverted by creative youth. For instance, most of the 
subcultural analysis that came out of the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies focused on 
this process. Hall and Jefferson (2006) argued that the huge amount of importance placed on 
commodified clothes and music by youth subcultures did not indicate the triumph of modern 
capitalism. From the 1970s onwards cultural theory performed complex and at times rather 
obscurantist intellectual gymnastics to convince the reader that the members of various 
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subcultures had invented a collective symbolic method of subverting capitalism, even though 
the majority spent most of their disposable income on mass-produced consumer items and 
showed only passing interest in substantive alternative politics. The youthful consumer was 
positioned as a romantic hero, a modern day David who could not be controlled by the 
ponderous capitalist Goliath. This ‘cultural turn’ was in essence an intellectual and political 
wrong-turn that is only just recently beginning to be seen for what it is – a colossal mistake 
(Smith, 2014; Hall and Winlow, 2015; Horsley, 2015; Raymen and Smith, 2015). Wildly over-
reacting to the failures of post-WWII state socialism and social democracy, the cultural turn 
founded itself negatively on the outright denial of the unavoidable fact that capitalism cannot 
be resisted at the point of consumption. Subsequently, it dismissed mass media and 
advertising’s ability to develop niche markets and integrate ostensibly ‘oppositional’ cultural 
trends. As time passed the cultural turn showed its colours by openly revealing its fear of what 
might happen if fundamental changes were made to capitalism’s economy and attendant 
ideological project.  
 
The cultural turn made a high art out of the refusal to engage with reality. Its unwavering 
optimism still survives. Indeed, it continues to be canonised in the textbooks and remains very 
much in vogue among social scientific accounts of youth culture, music and fashion (see, for 
example, Beal, 1995; Martin, 2009; Haenfler, 2012). Those working in this tradition cannot or 
simply do not want to detect the fundamental lack that pervades contemporary consumer 
culture and captures so much of its subjects’ energy. They tend to ignore the crass theme-park 
fakery of our shopping malls, the incessant privatisation of public space and the flood of 
advertising messages that debase our culture, foment hostile and envious social relations and 
solidify the position of money as the primary source of value. They cannot see consumerism’s 
co-option of leisure (Raymen and Smith, 2015), the stupefying and infantilising populism of 
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most mainstream media, and the general dumbing down, fragmentation and depoliticisation of 
a once vibrant and threatening working-class culture. They ignore the rather obvious fact that 
many of the perceived benefits of ownership are calibrated against the inability of others to 
own. Instead, they see legions of young people dipping nimbly in and out consumerism’s 
semiotic system, inverting corporate messages, and constructing their own norms and values 
that are inherently noble and opposed to all that is wrong with western consumer society. We 
might speculate that this basic narrative continues to exist at the forefront of youth sociology 
at least partly because it celebrates the underdog and positions young people are inherently 
rebellious and politically engaged. Constructing and canonising a celebratory account of young 
people battling against a repressive social order also obviates the need to engage with the more 
challenging and far less optimistic theoretical accounts of consumer culture offered by 
European neo-Marxists and post-Marxists in France and Germany (see especially Horkheimer 
and Adorno, 1997; Adorno, 2001; Baudrillard, 2007; Althusser, 2008; Stiegler, 2009).  
 
The cultural turn was imported into many aspects of critical criminology, but it found its true 
expression in cultural criminology. Despite the evolution of this sub-discipline and the growing 
interest of a small number of cultural criminologists in consumerism, ideology and political 
economy (see for example Hayward and Yar, 2006; Hayward, 2012), we should note that in 
general cultural criminology has not yet escaped the cultural turn to confront it on its own terms 
(see Ferrell, 1996; Presdee, 2000). To generalise, cultural criminology tends to assume that the 
stereotypically marginalised and under-educated ‘criminal’ is engaged in a fight against capital, 
cultural homogeneity and a broad system of oppressive social control. The criminal fights 
against the governance system that refused to give him a chance and criminalised his values on 
behalf of capitalist reproduction. With his crimes the criminal kicks back symbolically and 
materially at a system that has been stamping on his class for generations.  
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This position romanticises the working-class deviant and imbues him with characteristics 
difficult to find in the prisons, police stations and problem estates of the neoliberal era. Does 
the marginalised criminal truly or even vaguely understand the abstract system of capitalism 
and its social order, and is he so disgusted by his experiences of this capitalist reality that he 
structures his identity and social activity in opposition to it, even at the risk of significant 
punishment? Alternative research and theorisation suggest not (Ayres and Treadwell, 2012; 
Smith, 2014; Horsley, 2014; Hall and Winlow, 2015). Do not most acquisitive criminals, both 
in prisons and out on the street, tell us that their primary conscious motivation for committing 
crime is to acquire cash? Do they not blame their ignominious or traumatic experiences on 
anything but capitalism, and do they not display a clear desire to live a life defined by consumer 
indulgence? Too often liberal social scientists busy themselves scanning the barren landscape 
of contemporary neo-capitalism in search of cultural formations that might be construed as 
‘oppositional’ (see Hall and Winlow, 2007), and in so doing ignore the reality that’s right 
before their eyes.  
 
The painful reality is that the vast majority of the population are not particularly radical, and 
nor are they ethically opposed to the continuation of liberal capitalism. They are not disgusted 
by the commodification of culture, they are not particularly angry at the growing vacuity of 
parliamentary-democratic politics, and they are not morally opposed to neoliberalism’s brutal 
reallocation of money upwards. The silent majority tend to accept the basic constituents of our 
present reality, and if they are angry or dissatisfied with anything, it tends to be their own 
failure to achieve success within the capitalism system, and not the grotesque excesses of the 
capitalist system itself. The same tends be true of people involved in criminal markets (Winlow, 
2001; Winlow and Hall, 2009b). Might it not be reasonable to suggest that most acquisitive 
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crimes and even some violent crimes (ibid; Hall and Wilson, 2014) are bound up with the logic 
of capitalism and the anxieties, drives and desires it inspires? Should we really continue with 
accounts of crime as resistance when reality indicates quite clearly that the desire to seek 
gratification in consumer capitalism’s sign-value system is a well-established characteristic in 
most criminal cultures across the west? At the fundamental level of what we now call ‘values’, 
criminals are really very much like the rest of us. It is at the level of norms, or rather, the 
normative ways in which ‘values’ are enacted, that criminals tend to be a little different.  
 
We must now accept that the legions of people who head out to the high street, the shopping 
mall or the retail park each weekend are not using their consumer practice to oppose the 
inequities of capitalism’s social order. We must discard the comforts of romanticism and 
celebratory accounts of culture if our knowledge and understanding of contemporary culture is 
to progress. We must summon up the courage to appraise a truly disturbing reality. It is a reality 
in which we will see significant ecological change within our lifetime (Heinberg, 2011). We 
are already seeing the first signs of resource wars and mass migration caused by ecological 
change, the failure of nation-states and ongoing national and geopolitical conflict (Hiscock, 
2012; Klare, 2012; Pearce, 2013). Democratic politics, it appears, has lost the capacity to 
regulate the market (see Winlow et al, 2015), and, in most western societies, the gap between 
rich and poor grows wider with every passing year (see Picketty, 2014). Why should we assume 
that young people are inherently rebellious and carry with them the will to transform the 
injustices of the world? A minority may be politically active and keen to affect real change, but 
a great many more care nothing for politics and are happily distracted by the shallow pleasures 
of consumer culture. Cynicism has grown to become one of the defining features of our post-
crash cultural life. Some people may be angry at the injustices of the contemporary capitalism, 
but, for the moment at least, they can find no alternative to truly believe in. It is in this climate 
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of substantive political absence that many western sociologists and criminologists see 
consumer culture as a site of political potential (see Winlow et al., 2015).  
 
The challenge to criminology 
We can see quite clearly the inadequacies of the cultural turn. But why should a renewed 
critique of consumerism in its politico-economic context be of interest to criminologists? 
Surely everyone is influenced by consumer culture, so theories based on a critique of consumer 
culture cannot explain why a minority commit crime. Of course this is the standard riposte that 
does have some critical potency when levelled against early criminological positions such as 
strain, differential association and subcultural theory. However, most criminological theories 
are hampered by various forms of naturalism, sometimes overt and other times disavowed (see 
Hall, 2012a) – the malady of infinite aspiration, affinity to the in-group’s values, susceptibility 
to labelling, resistance to authority, and so on. Tied down by these various assumptions, 
criminological theory in general has ignored consumerism’s incursion and disruption of the 
basic processes that configure the individual’s construction of identity.  
 
We have explored this in fine detail elsewhere (see, for example, Hall et al, 2008), but the basic 
premise is that consumer culture has encouraged the growth of problematic forms of narcissism 
that rest not simply on advancing the interests of the self, but advancing one’s interests in 
relation to the downfall of others. Earlier we laid out in basic detail how the neoliberal mode 
of political economy has cast western populations into a condition of precariousness. This 
general condition fosters anxiety in each individual regarding their position in the social order. 
In its natural form anxiety is latent whilst its manifest form – fear – is objectively contingent; 
put simply, latent low-level anxiety can erupt into fear when a threatening object appears. 
However, there is nothing natural about anxiety’s permanent incitement in the form of 
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objectless anxiety, where it cannot make the transition into fear because the real object of fear 
– the unstable and insecure capitalist system – is ideologically disavowed. There nothing 
timeless and natural about a social system that casts its members into a permanent condition of 
objectless anxiety about their membership (Hall, 2012a). Capitalism was the first system in 
history to systematically dissolve the social for the purpose of generating permanent objectless 
anxiety and harnessing the ensuing human energy to the economy (Winlow and Hall, 2013). 
Life in the developing capitalist project cast individuals into a sociosymbolic competition 
ordered by the symbolic values carried by consumer objects.  After generations of living in 
such a precarious and competitive environment, the fleeting pleasures that accompany the 
ownership of designer items become valuable only in relation to the inability of others to own. 
The committed consumer utilises consumer symbolism to incite envy in others, and, of course, 
this performs a vital socioeconomic function. The great pleasure of owning a Mercedes-Benz 
motor car comes not in driving the car but in being seen to drive the car. Others must know that 
we have achieved this great feat of consumer success and elevated the self above the quotidian 
social world, thus inspiring envious others to do the same. Thus a majority of individuals enter 
the vortex of long hours at work, lifelong debt repayment and the endless consumption of 
symbolic objects, every day donating most of their energy to capitalism’s grid. 
 
Consumerism exacerbates and plays upon the constitutive lack that lies at the heart of the 
human subject. It has intruded into the internal life of the subject and creates a cultural climate 
of anxiety and competition. We become orientated toward hedonism and excess, and seek to 
separate ourselves from our communities by raising ourselves above them. Consumerism 
encourages the immediate gratification of desires and places us in a vortex of unfulfilling work, 
debt repayment and objectless anxiety. Unless the individual has the financial means to cope 
with the systematic refusal of roles and the subsequent downward mobility, the only escape is 
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upwards through the system. In such a perfect trap the temptation to discard traditional 
commitments to politics, civility and the common good is placed before all of us, no matter 
where we are located in the socioeconomic structure. Of course some relatively poor people 
commit minor acquisitive crimes to secure basic material goods, but even amongst the poor the 
lure of designer labels as the accepted means of avoiding humiliation is immensely powerful 
(Hall et al., 2008).  
 
Initial research suggests that the crucial factor influencing those who make the decision to 
commit acquisitive or violent crime as a way out of the vortex is the degree of cynicism and 
nihilism that has been instilled in the individual by complex permutations of ideology, 
socialisation and humiliating personal experiences (Winlow and Hall, 2006; 2009; Ellis, 2015). 
Of course the crime-consumer connection is woefully under-researched. Theories of the crime-
consumer nexus are ignored by right-wing criminologists, and either ignored or met with 
various degrees of suspicion and hostility by a sub-dominant liberal-left paradigm that seems 
to almost wilfully misunderstand the basic position. In a discipline still fixated on mechanistic 
positivism or dated social constructionism and social reaction theory it features very rarely in 
journals and remains as a brief aside in most criminology textbooks. Criminology’s enduring 
reluctance to construct new and convincing socially embedded accounts of criminal motivation 
in advanced capitalist consumer economies tells us a lot about the discipline’s underlying 
politics and values. We have discussed that in detail elsewhere (see Hall, 2012a; Hall and 
Winlow, 2015; Winlow and Hall, 2013; Winlow et al., 2015). It is heartening to note that 
recently a new ripple of interest has appeared, which might eventually grow into a new wave, 
but all that remains to be said here is that a vast and complex vista beckons the explorations of 
new generations of criminologists.  
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